Greg says,
I am sorry that my lengthy response wasn't very clear. Let me see if we can get on the same page. (Of course, it's not essential that we agree, right? Just essential that we understand the other person's arguments. I really appreciate that you're taking the time to do so with mine!)
So, there are a couple of misunderstandings here. Let's try to tackle them one by one. The first one is that I don't understand your model. At the beginning of your last message, you said, "our universe is just one out of a pool of infinity conceivable universes." Later, you said, "There would be no need for me to resort to a multiverse." So do you believe in the existence of multiple universes, or not?
My guess is not, because you said "conceivable". But since I don't know, let's explore both options.
Option 1: First, let's assume there is just one universe. Yes, it is one universe out of an infinity of conceivable universes, but none of these other universes is real. Since there is no explanation of how or why this particular universe is actualized over the other conceivable universes, any discussion of probability is useless anyway, normalizability problem or not. Do you agree? (I think so because at the end of your last message, you said, "the concept of probability is simply not meaningful in this context". Unless I misunderstand what you meant by that statement.) And if so, then you are stuck with an apparently finely-tuned universe with no explanation for it. The universe just IS, and that's the way it is. Pretty strange, right?
Option 2: Now let's assume there really is a real multiverse ensemble. In that case, there really is some physical mechanism that generates universes, so this real, physical mechanism has real probability distributions for how it generates all the constants and initial conditions. This is what I was saying last time, and if so, then again, you end up with either a very small probability of our universe being the way that it is, or a finely-tuned mechanism. Again, non-theists like the first (very small probability) because you can conceivably defeat that by N large. A finely-tuned mechanism would be problematic because then you have fine tuning at the most basic property of all of physical reality, and you can't explain that.
I really like one of the papers you pointed me to by Colyvan et al. In particular, I liked it when they said, "After all, if they [meaning the constants] could not have been different, the probability of the universe being just as we find it is 1, and no fine tuning has occurred. But what is the modality invoked here? Logical possibility? Conceptual possibility? Physical possibility? This is rarely spelled out in the usual presentations of the argument." (p. 326)
This is what I was saying, and I think you would agree. They go on to discuss the problem with using logical possibility as the modality, precisely because it runs into the normalizability problem, as you pointed out. What they are missing here is that, if there is no real mechanism that "decides" which constants to pick from, there is no point in talking about probability anyway, again, normalizability problem or not. We end up with the universe just IS.
Do you see a third option besides either these other universes are real, or they are not? Or do you see my characterization of the first option as flawed? (I think this is where more discussion will occur, but I'd like to hear what you have to say about it before I ramble about this on and on. And on and on...as I tend to do.
Another misunderstanding I think we had is related to what I just laid out as our two Options. In particular, you quoted me as saying, "everything's equally impossible or our current value is necessary." That in a nutshell is what I was saying our two options were. But I got that from the Colyvan paper: "The fine tuning argument, on its most plausible interpretation, hence not only shows that life-permitting universes are improbable, but, arguably, that they are impossible!" (p. 327) Juxtapose that statement with, "Physical possibility (construed as consistency with the laws of physics and physical constants as we find them) however, restricts the range too much for the proponent of the fine tuning argument, leaving the actual values as the only possible ones, and hence setting the probability at 1!" (p. 329, original emphases removed)
Another misunderstanding is how you then go on to characterize the normalizability problem: "each possible universe is either equally impossible, or they all have a small nonzero probability. They can't be impossible, because then the probabilities don't add up to 1, and they can't have a nonzero probability, because then the probabilities add up to infinity." The either/or statement you lead off with is not true. (Before I go on, I do think you characterized the normalizability problem accurately, but I don't think its conditions are met in reality.) Of course there are probability distributions with an infinite domain that are normalizable. We just don't know what the correct probability distribution to use is. But again, either there is a real mechanism that generates these universes, in which case there is a real distribution so it is really normalizable; or there is not, in which case it is futile to talk about any probability distribution because there is nothing to draw from.
Final misunderstanding: "If I'm right that the concept of probability is simply not meaningful in this context, then this dissolves the mystery. There would be no need for me to resort to a multiverse or necessity." Yeah, totally, you may be right that the concept of probability is not meaningful. That's what I was trying to say in my previous message (and is captured in Option 1 of this message). And, in which case, you would not need to resort to a multiverse because you have already assumed there is not one. But then you are stuck with necessity, because the universe just IS.
OK, so those are the critical parts where I either misunderstood you, or where I think you misunderstood me.
Also, let me end with this: this discussion is awesome and I hope you don't get too frustrated at how long I take to respond. You keep up the good work with cordially asking questions and rebutting Christians' arguments. I know a lot of atheists (and Christians too) that just want to have their say. Maybe that's you too, but you're hiding it really well, which means that's not you.
What I should have said in all of that was simply, I think you characterized the normalizability problem correctly but I just don't think it's relevant. Because either we're dealing with a real mechanism (which then must be normalizable by virtue of its being real) or not, in which case a discussion of probability is futile. What do you think?
Take care!
PS: I just took a look back at my previous message, and I even used "Option 1" and "Option 2" in that message too. I forgot, and I guess it's just what I think so strongly that it came out twice. Shame on me, because it looks like that means I didn't actually explain anything new this time. Let me know if that's true.
PPS: What I should have said in all of that was simply, I think you characterized the normalizability problem correctly but I just don't think it's relevant. Because either we're dealing with a real mechanism (which then must be normalizable by virtue of its being real) or not, in which case a discussion of probability is futile. What do you think?
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
Showing posts with label design. Show all posts
Showing posts with label design. Show all posts
Saturday, June 27, 2015
FTA part 7: Aron asks clarifying questions (part of the Aron series)
Aron wrote:
Thanks for the response! I want to make sure I understand you, and that you understand me. My objection was this: our universe is just one out of a pool of infinity conceivable universes. P(FT/~G) is the probability of picking a universe like ours at random. Probabilities only make sense if they add to one (ex/ for a die 1/6x6=1). So for the FTA to work, we need to be able to assign each possible universe a probability that allows them to add up to 1. But this is impossible because if each universe has a probability of 0, they all add up to 0. And if each universe is given a small nonzero probability, they add up to infinity. Since the probabilities can't add up to 1, it is meaningless to talk about probabilities here. The objection is that our intuitions have led us to extend to concept of "probability" far beyond the context in which it is applicable.
The way you characterized the normalizability objection is like this: "everything's equally impossible or our current value is necessary." I'm not sure this is what I was getting at. Instead, it should say "each possible universe is either equally impossible, or they all have a small nonzero probability. They can't be impossible, because then the probabilities don't add up to 1, and they can't have a nonzero probability, because then the probabilities add up to infinity."
If I'm right that the concept of probability is simply not meaningful in this context, then this dissolves the mystery. There would be no need for me to resort to a multiverse or necessity.
In sum, I'm not quite sure exactly what your objection was to the normalizability problem.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
Thanks for the response! I want to make sure I understand you, and that you understand me. My objection was this: our universe is just one out of a pool of infinity conceivable universes. P(FT/~G) is the probability of picking a universe like ours at random. Probabilities only make sense if they add to one (ex/ for a die 1/6x6=1). So for the FTA to work, we need to be able to assign each possible universe a probability that allows them to add up to 1. But this is impossible because if each universe has a probability of 0, they all add up to 0. And if each universe is given a small nonzero probability, they add up to infinity. Since the probabilities can't add up to 1, it is meaningless to talk about probabilities here. The objection is that our intuitions have led us to extend to concept of "probability" far beyond the context in which it is applicable.
The way you characterized the normalizability objection is like this: "everything's equally impossible or our current value is necessary." I'm not sure this is what I was getting at. Instead, it should say "each possible universe is either equally impossible, or they all have a small nonzero probability. They can't be impossible, because then the probabilities don't add up to 1, and they can't have a nonzero probability, because then the probabilities add up to infinity."
If I'm right that the concept of probability is simply not meaningful in this context, then this dissolves the mystery. There would be no need for me to resort to a multiverse or necessity.
In sum, I'm not quite sure exactly what your objection was to the normalizability problem.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
FTA part 6: Defying intuition, the multiverse, or necessity (part of the Aron series)
Greg says,
Yes, the normalization problem does seem to come up, doesn't it? But the more I think about it, the more I think it's a cover-up. Here's what I mean. Just like the initial objection you raised about degree of fine tuning not translating into a rigorous probability, in this case this is just another layer of subtlety, but the conclusion is the same. In going deeper with this, we are essentially just pushing it back another layer.
Another way to think about it is, the first level of fine-tuning is very intuitive, and speaks easily to the common person. "Wow! Look how finely-tuned these constants are! This argues for intention in the make-up of the universe." This is the intuitive conclusion, and sometimes intuition is right.
On the other hand, sometimes intuition is wrong. For someone who wants to contest this conclusion (and please don't consider that turn of the phrase to mean I think the challenger of the FTA is disingenuous...we need to think deeply about it), there is always a way to get out of it. There's always a door to exit for the skeptic. But every time you exit the door, you end up in another room that is smaller and more difficult to exit. A smaller door is there to exit the next room, and still smaller. Pretty soon you'll need one of Alice's mushrooms to get out of the door, it's so small. How deep does the rabbit hole go?
Did that sound pompous? Sorry, I thought of that word picture last night and I really liked it. In any case, my point is that the more one plays the skeptic to deny what intuition is telling us, the harder you have to work and the more you have to deny precious bits of reality.
OK, now that I've played it up so much, do I actually have an argument? (Hee-hee, I hope so. We'll see if you like it or not.)
So let's start with the point I made last time. Either the small life-permissible interval of G is improbable, or the probability distribution from which we are drawing G must be itself finely-tuned (aka, atypical). That makes intuitive sense. It's a bit harder to understand than the basic "G must be within one part in 10^60, therefore God did it," but it's still pretty intuitive. The rebuttal to that is we have no reason to consider any particular sort of probability measure. Indeed, the normalizability problem destroys fine-tuning: either everything's equally impossible, or our current value is necessary (P = 1). What method do we have to restrict the probability distribution to some intermediate shape?
So, we drop-kick intuition and need to go one level deeper. (Remember how I asked, "How deep does the rabbit hole go?" I have a feeling to get to the bottom of this conversation, we'll eventually have to discuss properly basic beliefs and brains-in-a-vat. It's a steep price to pay to be constantly skeptical of the intuitive power of the FTA.) If we really want to have a probability distribution to draw from, we need a mechanism. Here our discussion will bifurcate into two plausible solutions.
(Before I do that, can I mention an aside here? Initially, I presented the FTA as a rigorous Bayesian-type proof. Recall you challenged my ability to say P(FT | ~G) is super-low. Now I just want to recall the point that these probabilities in Bayesian arguments are *epistemic*. Meaning, they're "what are the odds of that happening?"-type probabilities. This is the reason why the Bayesian argument goes through, because most will understand the fine-tuning of the constants and conditions of the universe and of earth and intuitively agree that P(FT | ~G) is low, even if it can't be proven rigorously.)
OK, back to the bifurcation. There are now two naturalistic options (to avoid God): (1) either the universe is alone (and necessary), or (2) it is one of an ensemble of universes, commonly called the multiverse (which then itself is necessary).
Option 1: if the universe is necessary and alone, then all the constants and conditions could not have been other than what they are. In that sense, all of these probabilities would be unity. How could it have been any other way if the universe itself is necessary? But if that is the case, we again are stuck with asking why it had to have been this way. What is it about the universe and necessity that made it so that life could possibly exist? Especially when it seems like there are so many other ways it could have been that would have precluded life. Again, we are now not only stuck with asking "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (since the universe has no explanation for its existence, it would seem rather odd that it would be the necessary entity), but also with "Why is the universe the way that it is" (since it being just the way it is permitted intelligent life to develop within it to ask these questions).
Now, one way you could answer these questions is flippantly. Dr. Krauss is a famous example of this, with his, "'Why' questions are silly." But I don't regard you as thinking that. So then why do you think there is something rather than nothing? Why do you think the universe is the way it is? Remember, without God and thus without intention, there is no explanation for these facts.
Option 2: if the universe is one of many universes in the multiverse, then plausibly this could explain how the perceived fine-tuning arose. Returning to the normalizability problem, the main issue I have with it is, if there really is a natural mechanism that "chooses" values of constants for the universe, then it cannot have the normalizability problem. This is because it must have a real probability distribution, not this hypothetical/philosophical/no-logical-restriction type distribution. So the existence of the multiverse then solves the normalizability problem: either the probability distribution is typical, and thus our universe is rare, or the universe-generating mechanism itself has a finely-tuned probability distribution to produce a bunch of universes like ours. In the second case, our universe is not rare (they're all like ours), but the fine-tuning is in the multiverse itself.
Skeptics rather like the first case: our universe is rare, but the number of universes (probabilistic resources) is so high that one such as ours is bound to have been generated randomly.
I could go on and on about the multiverse, so let me leave it with this so you can respond before I go off the deep end: I don't see Option 1 as viable. For the skeptic, the universe just can't be the necessary entity. It raises too many questions about sufficient explanation. So, Option 2, the multiverse, must be the fall back if you want to escape through the ever-shrinking skeptical door. Further more, the second case of Option 2 (the multiverse itself is finely-tuned) cannot be the case for the skeptic, as this would be identical in ontology to Option 1. Therefore, as I see it, the skeptic must choose the first case of Option 2: the multiverse generates widely-varying random universes, one of which is the lucky one (ours).
Is that where you think you'd go with this?
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
Yes, the normalization problem does seem to come up, doesn't it? But the more I think about it, the more I think it's a cover-up. Here's what I mean. Just like the initial objection you raised about degree of fine tuning not translating into a rigorous probability, in this case this is just another layer of subtlety, but the conclusion is the same. In going deeper with this, we are essentially just pushing it back another layer.
Another way to think about it is, the first level of fine-tuning is very intuitive, and speaks easily to the common person. "Wow! Look how finely-tuned these constants are! This argues for intention in the make-up of the universe." This is the intuitive conclusion, and sometimes intuition is right.
On the other hand, sometimes intuition is wrong. For someone who wants to contest this conclusion (and please don't consider that turn of the phrase to mean I think the challenger of the FTA is disingenuous...we need to think deeply about it), there is always a way to get out of it. There's always a door to exit for the skeptic. But every time you exit the door, you end up in another room that is smaller and more difficult to exit. A smaller door is there to exit the next room, and still smaller. Pretty soon you'll need one of Alice's mushrooms to get out of the door, it's so small. How deep does the rabbit hole go?
Did that sound pompous? Sorry, I thought of that word picture last night and I really liked it. In any case, my point is that the more one plays the skeptic to deny what intuition is telling us, the harder you have to work and the more you have to deny precious bits of reality.
OK, now that I've played it up so much, do I actually have an argument? (Hee-hee, I hope so. We'll see if you like it or not.)
So let's start with the point I made last time. Either the small life-permissible interval of G is improbable, or the probability distribution from which we are drawing G must be itself finely-tuned (aka, atypical). That makes intuitive sense. It's a bit harder to understand than the basic "G must be within one part in 10^60, therefore God did it," but it's still pretty intuitive. The rebuttal to that is we have no reason to consider any particular sort of probability measure. Indeed, the normalizability problem destroys fine-tuning: either everything's equally impossible, or our current value is necessary (P = 1). What method do we have to restrict the probability distribution to some intermediate shape?
So, we drop-kick intuition and need to go one level deeper. (Remember how I asked, "How deep does the rabbit hole go?" I have a feeling to get to the bottom of this conversation, we'll eventually have to discuss properly basic beliefs and brains-in-a-vat. It's a steep price to pay to be constantly skeptical of the intuitive power of the FTA.) If we really want to have a probability distribution to draw from, we need a mechanism. Here our discussion will bifurcate into two plausible solutions.
(Before I do that, can I mention an aside here? Initially, I presented the FTA as a rigorous Bayesian-type proof. Recall you challenged my ability to say P(FT | ~G) is super-low. Now I just want to recall the point that these probabilities in Bayesian arguments are *epistemic*. Meaning, they're "what are the odds of that happening?"-type probabilities. This is the reason why the Bayesian argument goes through, because most will understand the fine-tuning of the constants and conditions of the universe and of earth and intuitively agree that P(FT | ~G) is low, even if it can't be proven rigorously.)
OK, back to the bifurcation. There are now two naturalistic options (to avoid God): (1) either the universe is alone (and necessary), or (2) it is one of an ensemble of universes, commonly called the multiverse (which then itself is necessary).
Option 1: if the universe is necessary and alone, then all the constants and conditions could not have been other than what they are. In that sense, all of these probabilities would be unity. How could it have been any other way if the universe itself is necessary? But if that is the case, we again are stuck with asking why it had to have been this way. What is it about the universe and necessity that made it so that life could possibly exist? Especially when it seems like there are so many other ways it could have been that would have precluded life. Again, we are now not only stuck with asking "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (since the universe has no explanation for its existence, it would seem rather odd that it would be the necessary entity), but also with "Why is the universe the way that it is" (since it being just the way it is permitted intelligent life to develop within it to ask these questions).
Now, one way you could answer these questions is flippantly. Dr. Krauss is a famous example of this, with his, "'Why' questions are silly." But I don't regard you as thinking that. So then why do you think there is something rather than nothing? Why do you think the universe is the way it is? Remember, without God and thus without intention, there is no explanation for these facts.
Option 2: if the universe is one of many universes in the multiverse, then plausibly this could explain how the perceived fine-tuning arose. Returning to the normalizability problem, the main issue I have with it is, if there really is a natural mechanism that "chooses" values of constants for the universe, then it cannot have the normalizability problem. This is because it must have a real probability distribution, not this hypothetical/philosophical/no-logical-restriction type distribution. So the existence of the multiverse then solves the normalizability problem: either the probability distribution is typical, and thus our universe is rare, or the universe-generating mechanism itself has a finely-tuned probability distribution to produce a bunch of universes like ours. In the second case, our universe is not rare (they're all like ours), but the fine-tuning is in the multiverse itself.
Skeptics rather like the first case: our universe is rare, but the number of universes (probabilistic resources) is so high that one such as ours is bound to have been generated randomly.
I could go on and on about the multiverse, so let me leave it with this so you can respond before I go off the deep end: I don't see Option 1 as viable. For the skeptic, the universe just can't be the necessary entity. It raises too many questions about sufficient explanation. So, Option 2, the multiverse, must be the fall back if you want to escape through the ever-shrinking skeptical door. Further more, the second case of Option 2 (the multiverse itself is finely-tuned) cannot be the case for the skeptic, as this would be identical in ontology to Option 1. Therefore, as I see it, the skeptic must choose the first case of Option 2: the multiverse generates widely-varying random universes, one of which is the lucky one (ours).
Is that where you think you'd go with this?
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
FTA part 4: Why fine-tuning means the universe is improbable (part of the Aron series)
Greg says:
OK, great, all that is good to know for me. Hopefully, it will help us avoid talking past each other.
I'll go ahead now and engage with your points from your previous post. First, I am not sure if we want to go down the path of discussing Spinoza. I don’t have much interest in it, and you didn’t seem to push it too hard, so we’ll put that out of mind, unless you want to bring it back up at some point.
But perhaps what I could say about it is to give you a bible verse that is germane to the topic of P(FT | G):
Isaiah 45:18 - he who created the heavens,
he is God;
he who fashioned and made the earth,
he founded it;
he did not create it to be empty,
but formed it to be inhabited
OK, on to the topic of P(FT | ~G). In vernacular, what is the probability that the finely-tuned aspects of the universe would arise naturalistically? This is the term in the fine-tuning argument that typically takes on values like 10^-60 or 10^-120, etc. It’s the term that I called “epsilon.”
In particular, you said that I needed to be careful with that term, and you are absolutely right. Like you said, if you really want to think deeply about this, it’s not really accurate to just take the 10^-60 number and say that’s the probability. Again, you are 100% correct. So why do so many people (including myself) do that? TBH, I think for most people, they probably don’t realize the subtlety. For me, it’s just so much easier to communicate the idea that way, and in the end, if you want to go deeper, the conclusion is the same anyway, because you are just pushing back the fine tuning one step. But the route is indeed more subtle.
BTW, please read the following as if I were discussing an exciting topic that I like to think about and on which I am interested in hearing your feedback, rather than some guns-blazing attack on the non-theistic worldview. Because the former is the way I mean it, rather than the latter.
To make matters concrete, let’s unpack the discussion by focusing on the example of big G, which is the constant that is often said to be finely-tuned to one part in 10^60. It is not necessarily the best example to take, since it has its flaws, but it’s certainly an easy one to discuss. As well, anything I say here can be easily generalized to discussion of other constants.
Now, without loss of generality (and for the sake of discussion), we are free to pick units such that G = 1, so that the life-permitting range for values of G is 1 - 10^-60 < G < 1 + 10^-60. This is a narrow range for sure, but it does not necessarily translate into a low probability, because that depends on the probability distribution from which we are randomly drawing values of G.
(And of course, we are now ranging into philosophical/metaphysical speculation...we have no known mechanism by which we may suppose the existence of a probability distribution, nor one from which a value of G could be “drawn”, but in the end I don’t think it matters. I think the argument makes intuitive sense and will apply to just about any theoretical/hypothetical mechanism that one could come up with.)
Let’s imagine for a second that the probability distribution from which we are drawing the value of G is uniform from zero to two. In that case, p(G) = 0.5 uniformly on that interval. Then P(1 - 10^-60 < G < 1 + 10^-60) does indeed equal 10^-60. In this “special” case, the range of life-permitting values really does equal the probability of getting a value within that range.
But what if the probability distribution were a normal distribution with mu = 1 and sigma = 10^-61? In other words, a really, really tight distribution around the desired value of G = 1. In that case, we are *virtually guaranteed* to have a value of G within the life permitting range.
However…(do you see where I’m going with this?)...the only way you may legitimately assume we have such a “special,” atypical probability distribution for G is if you admit there is fine-tuning in the probability distribution itself. How in the world would one, apart from an intelligent creator with a purpose in mind, possibly justify having a probability distribution that forces this otherwise seemingly serendipitous, life-permitting value of G? (And that’s just one finely-tuned parameter.)
In other words, in my estimation, by correctly pointing out that the narrow fine-tuning range does not equate directly to probability, you escape the fine-tuning at that level, only to encounter it at a deeper level. With the fine-tuning argument, not only do you have to answer the age-old question of, “Why is there something rather than nothing,” but also, “Why is the something (that be, rather than nothing) the way that it is?”
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
OK, great, all that is good to know for me. Hopefully, it will help us avoid talking past each other.
I'll go ahead now and engage with your points from your previous post. First, I am not sure if we want to go down the path of discussing Spinoza. I don’t have much interest in it, and you didn’t seem to push it too hard, so we’ll put that out of mind, unless you want to bring it back up at some point.
But perhaps what I could say about it is to give you a bible verse that is germane to the topic of P(FT | G):
Isaiah 45:18 - he who created the heavens,
he is God;
he who fashioned and made the earth,
he founded it;
he did not create it to be empty,
but formed it to be inhabited
OK, on to the topic of P(FT | ~G). In vernacular, what is the probability that the finely-tuned aspects of the universe would arise naturalistically? This is the term in the fine-tuning argument that typically takes on values like 10^-60 or 10^-120, etc. It’s the term that I called “epsilon.”
In particular, you said that I needed to be careful with that term, and you are absolutely right. Like you said, if you really want to think deeply about this, it’s not really accurate to just take the 10^-60 number and say that’s the probability. Again, you are 100% correct. So why do so many people (including myself) do that? TBH, I think for most people, they probably don’t realize the subtlety. For me, it’s just so much easier to communicate the idea that way, and in the end, if you want to go deeper, the conclusion is the same anyway, because you are just pushing back the fine tuning one step. But the route is indeed more subtle.
BTW, please read the following as if I were discussing an exciting topic that I like to think about and on which I am interested in hearing your feedback, rather than some guns-blazing attack on the non-theistic worldview. Because the former is the way I mean it, rather than the latter.
To make matters concrete, let’s unpack the discussion by focusing on the example of big G, which is the constant that is often said to be finely-tuned to one part in 10^60. It is not necessarily the best example to take, since it has its flaws, but it’s certainly an easy one to discuss. As well, anything I say here can be easily generalized to discussion of other constants.
Now, without loss of generality (and for the sake of discussion), we are free to pick units such that G = 1, so that the life-permitting range for values of G is 1 - 10^-60 < G < 1 + 10^-60. This is a narrow range for sure, but it does not necessarily translate into a low probability, because that depends on the probability distribution from which we are randomly drawing values of G.
(And of course, we are now ranging into philosophical/metaphysical speculation...we have no known mechanism by which we may suppose the existence of a probability distribution, nor one from which a value of G could be “drawn”, but in the end I don’t think it matters. I think the argument makes intuitive sense and will apply to just about any theoretical/hypothetical mechanism that one could come up with.)
Let’s imagine for a second that the probability distribution from which we are drawing the value of G is uniform from zero to two. In that case, p(G) = 0.5 uniformly on that interval. Then P(1 - 10^-60 < G < 1 + 10^-60) does indeed equal 10^-60. In this “special” case, the range of life-permitting values really does equal the probability of getting a value within that range.
But what if the probability distribution were a normal distribution with mu = 1 and sigma = 10^-61? In other words, a really, really tight distribution around the desired value of G = 1. In that case, we are *virtually guaranteed* to have a value of G within the life permitting range.
However…(do you see where I’m going with this?)...the only way you may legitimately assume we have such a “special,” atypical probability distribution for G is if you admit there is fine-tuning in the probability distribution itself. How in the world would one, apart from an intelligent creator with a purpose in mind, possibly justify having a probability distribution that forces this otherwise seemingly serendipitous, life-permitting value of G? (And that’s just one finely-tuned parameter.)
In other words, in my estimation, by correctly pointing out that the narrow fine-tuning range does not equate directly to probability, you escape the fine-tuning at that level, only to encounter it at a deeper level. With the fine-tuning argument, not only do you have to answer the age-old question of, “Why is there something rather than nothing,” but also, “Why is the something (that be, rather than nothing) the way that it is?”
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
Tuesday, March 17, 2015
FTA part 3: Aron answers my general questions (part of the Aron series)
Hi Greg!
1. Not a believer. I'm interested because I have friends who are and it's just generally interesting.
2. Kalam or fine tuning. They have the most intuitive appeal, and they implicate lots of philosophical issues.
3. Problem of evil or potential inconsistencies in the definition of theism.
4. Not a scientism-ist. These sorts of questions are inherently philosophical questions, not scientific ones.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
1. Not a believer. I'm interested because I have friends who are and it's just generally interesting.
2. Kalam or fine tuning. They have the most intuitive appeal, and they implicate lots of philosophical issues.
3. Problem of evil or potential inconsistencies in the definition of theism.
4. Not a scientism-ist. These sorts of questions are inherently philosophical questions, not scientific ones.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
Saturday, January 31, 2015
FTA part 2: General questions for Aron (part of the Aron Series)
Aron, how are you doing? I’m glad to hear from you again! I hope you continue to think deeply about these questions.
To be honest, I didn't realize that I was going against what Larry believed about using epistemic probabilities and such. At any rate, I am glad we came to some agreement about how TAG could possibly be used in an argument, even if we still don’t agree on whether certainty in TAG renders evidence for God useless.
Hey, but now that we've come to some sort of conclusion, it sounds like you want to switch gears and go more in-depth into the fine tuning? Would that be correct? I’m interested in doing that. I find the fine tuning argument fascinating, and it is definitely one of the arguments that first opened the door to my skeptical way of thinking to allow me to entertain the possibility that God exists.
But before we get too in-depth with this argument, and I see that you have put forth a couple challenges to it, I was wondering if you’d answer a couple of questions? The reason why is I don’t know you very well. (Maybe Larry does, but I don’t!)
First, I am assuming you are not a believer in Jesus in the classical Christian sense. Is that right? Did you ever at one point consider yourself to be a Christian?
Assuming your answer to the first question is, “No, I am not a believer,” what is your interest in Ratio Christi?
What is your favorite argument in favor of the existence of God?
What is your favorite argument against the existence of God?
A lot of atheists these days take a very hard scientistic stance, in which the only allowable evidence in discussions about whether God exists is evidence that can be tested scientifically. I am assuming that would not be your stance, given how into the TAG you got, but I just wanted to make sure.
Thanks a bunch for humoring me on answering these questions. The reason why I think they’re important is because knowing your background might help us avoid talking past each other. To be fair, I will give you my answers.
I am a believer, but I grew up atheist. My favorite argument in favor of the existence of God is...well, it’s hard to pin one down. I've switched back and forth over the years, but as I said, the fine tuning argument was one of the first that I heard and it really went along way to convincing me to go from being an atheist to theist. For this reason, I am really passionate about apologetics, which is why I am passionate about Ratio Christi.
My favorite argument for atheism is the problem of evil, as well as the horrific events in the OT as evidence against Yahweh being perfectly good; those two are very tough problems for the Christian.
I am clearly not a proponent of scientism, although I am a scientist.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
To be honest, I didn't realize that I was going against what Larry believed about using epistemic probabilities and such. At any rate, I am glad we came to some agreement about how TAG could possibly be used in an argument, even if we still don’t agree on whether certainty in TAG renders evidence for God useless.
Hey, but now that we've come to some sort of conclusion, it sounds like you want to switch gears and go more in-depth into the fine tuning? Would that be correct? I’m interested in doing that. I find the fine tuning argument fascinating, and it is definitely one of the arguments that first opened the door to my skeptical way of thinking to allow me to entertain the possibility that God exists.
But before we get too in-depth with this argument, and I see that you have put forth a couple challenges to it, I was wondering if you’d answer a couple of questions? The reason why is I don’t know you very well. (Maybe Larry does, but I don’t!)
First, I am assuming you are not a believer in Jesus in the classical Christian sense. Is that right? Did you ever at one point consider yourself to be a Christian?
Assuming your answer to the first question is, “No, I am not a believer,” what is your interest in Ratio Christi?
What is your favorite argument in favor of the existence of God?
What is your favorite argument against the existence of God?
A lot of atheists these days take a very hard scientistic stance, in which the only allowable evidence in discussions about whether God exists is evidence that can be tested scientifically. I am assuming that would not be your stance, given how into the TAG you got, but I just wanted to make sure.
Thanks a bunch for humoring me on answering these questions. The reason why I think they’re important is because knowing your background might help us avoid talking past each other. To be fair, I will give you my answers.
I am a believer, but I grew up atheist. My favorite argument in favor of the existence of God is...well, it’s hard to pin one down. I've switched back and forth over the years, but as I said, the fine tuning argument was one of the first that I heard and it really went along way to convincing me to go from being an atheist to theist. For this reason, I am really passionate about apologetics, which is why I am passionate about Ratio Christi.
My favorite argument for atheism is the problem of evil, as well as the horrific events in the OT as evidence against Yahweh being perfectly good; those two are very tough problems for the Christian.
I am clearly not a proponent of scientism, although I am a scientist.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
FTA part 1: Aron challenges that the probability if fine tuning is low (part of the Aron Series)
Aron wrote:
I like your cumulative case method because it looks like you're using Jeffrey conditioning. The probability of G in light of TAGs uncertain status=P(G/TAG)xP(TAG)+P(G/~TAG)xP(~TAG). The left side would be 1x.6, and the right side would be .4 multiplied by whatever you think P(G) is given all the other evidence. In this case, you can use TAG along with evidential arguments. That's why I think the Bayesian approach is best, bc it can let you do stuff that you couldn't do if you were offering TAG as a proof. I don't think Larry would be open to this approach though.
My initial argument was offered against someone who uses TAG as a deductive argument, so my point still holds in that context. I think you offer a good way to sidestep the problem. But even with the method you offer, my main point still stands: evidential arguments can only make a contribution if you're open to the possibility that TAG is wrong.
About fine tuning. I agree for the most part. There are a few ways I could push back. For what it's worth, there's a long tradition, going back to at least Spinoza, of arguing that P(FT/G) is either 0 or near 0. (Spinoza obviously didn't talk about fine tuning per se, but he argued that God wouldn't/couldn't create a universe bc he'd have no reason to do so, given his lack of wants/needs).
Also, be careful with P(FT/~G). The fine tuning data doesn't say this number is small, it says that the life permitting range of values is small. If someone says a constant is fine tuned to one part in 10 billion, they aren't saying that there is a 1/10 billion chance that the constant would have that value. Instead, they are just saying that if the value of the constant were changed by one ten billionth of a percent, then life couldn't exist. Claims about fine tuning are about the narrowness of the life permitting range of values a constant could take. Additional argumentation is needed to show that its improbable that a constant would take a value in that range. To say that P(FT/~G) is low, you need to make some philosophical assumptions, such as the adoption of the principle of indifference and the rejection of the axiom of countable additivity.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
I like your cumulative case method because it looks like you're using Jeffrey conditioning. The probability of G in light of TAGs uncertain status=P(G/TAG)xP(TAG)+P(G/~TAG)xP(~TAG). The left side would be 1x.6, and the right side would be .4 multiplied by whatever you think P(G) is given all the other evidence. In this case, you can use TAG along with evidential arguments. That's why I think the Bayesian approach is best, bc it can let you do stuff that you couldn't do if you were offering TAG as a proof. I don't think Larry would be open to this approach though.
My initial argument was offered against someone who uses TAG as a deductive argument, so my point still holds in that context. I think you offer a good way to sidestep the problem. But even with the method you offer, my main point still stands: evidential arguments can only make a contribution if you're open to the possibility that TAG is wrong.
About fine tuning. I agree for the most part. There are a few ways I could push back. For what it's worth, there's a long tradition, going back to at least Spinoza, of arguing that P(FT/G) is either 0 or near 0. (Spinoza obviously didn't talk about fine tuning per se, but he argued that God wouldn't/couldn't create a universe bc he'd have no reason to do so, given his lack of wants/needs).
Also, be careful with P(FT/~G). The fine tuning data doesn't say this number is small, it says that the life permitting range of values is small. If someone says a constant is fine tuned to one part in 10 billion, they aren't saying that there is a 1/10 billion chance that the constant would have that value. Instead, they are just saying that if the value of the constant were changed by one ten billionth of a percent, then life couldn't exist. Claims about fine tuning are about the narrowness of the life permitting range of values a constant could take. Additional argumentation is needed to show that its improbable that a constant would take a value in that range. To say that P(FT/~G) is low, you need to make some philosophical assumptions, such as the adoption of the principle of indifference and the rejection of the axiom of countable additivity.
[See summary page of this discussion, with links to all the posts, here.]
Series: a discussion with Aron from Maryland
Dear all,
Last year, I began an internet discussion with a non-theist named Aron from Maryland. At the moment, this discussion is ongoing, and will be continuously updated here, so check back often.
We started out talking about the Transcendental Argument for God's existence (TAG), and in the end agreed how it could be used in a bigger cumulative case.
We have since transitioned to discussing the fine-tuning argument (FTA). It's great discussion, and I hope others will follow along.
Transcript of our discussion about TAG (we start transitioning to discussing FTA at the end):
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/aron-and-transcendental-argument-part.html
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-1-aron-challenges-that.html
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-2-general-questions-for-aron.html
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-3-aron-answers-my-general.html
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-4-why-fine-tuning-means.html
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/06/fta-part-5-aron-introduces.html
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/06/fta-part-6-defying-intuition-multiverse.html
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/06/fta-part-8-clarification-on-multiverse.html
Last year, I began an internet discussion with a non-theist named Aron from Maryland. At the moment, this discussion is ongoing, and will be continuously updated here, so check back often.
We started out talking about the Transcendental Argument for God's existence (TAG), and in the end agreed how it could be used in a bigger cumulative case.
We have since transitioned to discussing the fine-tuning argument (FTA). It's great discussion, and I hope others will follow along.
Transcript of our discussion about TAG (we start transitioning to discussing FTA at the end):
http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/aron-and-transcendental-argument-part.html
FTA part 1: Aron challenges that the probability if fine tuning is low
A beginning to our discussion of the FTA, where Aron opens with acknowledging our general agreement of how to apply the TAG, and also suggests the probability that our universe would be the way it is (usually called "finely-tuned" in theistic circles) in not actually low:http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-1-aron-challenges-that.html
FTA part 2: General questions for Aron
I answer with some general questions for Aron to make sure we're not talking past each other:http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-2-general-questions-for-aron.html
FTA part 3: Aron answers my general questions
Aron then answers my general questions, so I think we're ready to start the discussion in earnest.http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-3-aron-answers-my-general.html
FTA part 4: Why fine-tuning means the universe is improbable
I begin to lay out the fine-tuning argument and press why we can say the probability that the fine-tuning would occur without God is small. Please note that Aron and I both agree that the constants of the universe are finely-tuned, in that they cannot vary by much before the universe is no longer life permitting.http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/01/fta-part-4-why-fine-tuning-means.html
FTA part 5: Aron introduces the normalizability problem
Aron responds by noting that since we are appealing to "possible universes" (which may not even exist), we have no idea what values of the constants of physics are more probable than others, so we must assume any value has equal probability to any other. However, since we have no way to restrict the ranges these values may take on, we have to allow for infinite ranges (i.e., zero to infinity). Therefore, the probability distribution is not really a probability distribution. In this statement, Aron is introducing the "non-normalizability" problem. To strengthen his argument, Aron cites famed Christian apologist Dr. Timothy McGrew. This is a big deal.http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/06/fta-part-5-aron-introduces.html
FTA part 6: Defying intuition, the multiverse, or necessity
I agree that the non-normalizability problem that Aron introduced in the previous post is a big deal. Then I lay out how the intuition of the FTA argument is layered, and every time a skeptic denies the intuitive conclusion that fine-tuning leads to the conclusion that God most likely designed the universe, he or she must give up some more obvious conclusion for a more skeptical one. This is my "How deep does the rabbit hole go?" story. But, we do need to go deeper, so I note that there are two options. Either the multiverse exists, in which case the probabilities are indeed normalizable (because there is a real mechanism generating universes), or our universe is all there is. In the second case (which Aron wants to go with), even if the probabilities are meaningless (since there is only one universe), we still have a situation (fine-tuning) that demands an explanation.http://twobooksapproach.blogspot.com/2015/06/fta-part-6-defying-intuition-multiverse.html
FTA part 7: Aron asks clarifying questions
Aron reasserts that the non-normalizability problem, since it leads to the conclusion that probabilities are meaningless, also means that the fine-tuning argument just does not work. He asks for more clarification and explanation on my part.
FTA part 8: Clarification on the multiverse vs. necessity
Here I clarify what I said in my previous post. In particular, I clarify that if Aron wants to go with a single universe, and claim that fine-tuning does not lead to small probabilities, this is the same as saying (1) the universe just IS, with no explanation for it, and none needed; and (2) the universe just IS FINELY-TUNED FOR LIFE, with no explanation for that either, and none needed.
Thursday, July 25, 2013
The Multiverse: science or a cop-out?
Recently, over at townhall.com, columnist Dennis Prager wrote a piece on "Why Some Scientists Embrace the 'Multiverse'". The article is a good read; in the first part, Prager describes the incredible scientific evidence for the design of the universe for the benefit of life. The bio-friendliness of the universe is undeniable, and is admitted by scientists of all stripes. But the "design" of the universe then begs the question: who designed it? Or, how did it come to be this way?
However, Prager then transitions into a discussion of the multiverse (the idea that there are many, perhaps infinite, universes out there). If true, the multiverse could get around the problem of the fine-tuning. After all, if there are an infinite number of universes out there, all with random laws of physics, there would just have to be one in which the laws were "just right" for life to exist. No matter how improbable it would be for you to hit that bullseye perfectly, given an infinite number of tries, it's bound to happen. And that's the universe we live in.
But Prager implies the multiverse is solely proposed by scientists in order to get around the fine-tuning. This is incorrect. The multiverse hypothesis is a direct inference from the laws of physics. If we've got the equations of our own universe right, there is a very good chance there are other universes out there. Just because it's impossible to detect them doesn't mean they aren't there. And that certainly doesn't mean the multiverse hypothesis is some concoction by atheists to get around the fine-tuning.
So if the multiverse exists, and I don't think we can discount it, where does that leave the fine-tuning argument? It does seem to provide a nice refutation of fine-tuning pointing to God as designer. Perhaps that's why it's so popular, and why it gets so much attention. (And perhaps that's Prager's actual point: that the multiverse is popular with scientists, even though there is no direct evidence for it, because it seems to satisfy their worldview.) But the reality is, the multiverse only makes the design argument for God stronger.
However, Prager then transitions into a discussion of the multiverse (the idea that there are many, perhaps infinite, universes out there). If true, the multiverse could get around the problem of the fine-tuning. After all, if there are an infinite number of universes out there, all with random laws of physics, there would just have to be one in which the laws were "just right" for life to exist. No matter how improbable it would be for you to hit that bullseye perfectly, given an infinite number of tries, it's bound to happen. And that's the universe we live in.
But Prager implies the multiverse is solely proposed by scientists in order to get around the fine-tuning. This is incorrect. The multiverse hypothesis is a direct inference from the laws of physics. If we've got the equations of our own universe right, there is a very good chance there are other universes out there. Just because it's impossible to detect them doesn't mean they aren't there. And that certainly doesn't mean the multiverse hypothesis is some concoction by atheists to get around the fine-tuning.
So if the multiverse exists, and I don't think we can discount it, where does that leave the fine-tuning argument? It does seem to provide a nice refutation of fine-tuning pointing to God as designer. Perhaps that's why it's so popular, and why it gets so much attention. (And perhaps that's Prager's actual point: that the multiverse is popular with scientists, even though there is no direct evidence for it, because it seems to satisfy their worldview.) But the reality is, the multiverse only makes the design argument for God stronger.
Thursday, June 20, 2013
A response to "Dear Believer, Why Do You Believe" part 2 of 2
Last time, I began a critique of the popular YouTube clip titled, "Dear Believer, Why Do You Believe". The thing to keep in mind is that the main premise of this video is that no religious person has adequate reasons to believe. If this premise were true, then the objections raised in this video actually hold some weight. However, in that case, the objections would essentially be moot: if no religious person has good reasons for their belief, what is the point of raising more objections.
But instead, religious folk, and Christians in particular, have many reasons to believe! If you follow my blog, you'll find some of those reasons.
As for the rest of my critique of the video, I have identified six common objections to religion in general, and Christianity in particular, and I offered a response to the first three last time. Here I will go through the three remaining objections raised in this video.
The problem for the atheist who espouses the views in this video is there are not only many adequate reasons to believe in a god in general, and the Christian God in particular, but these reasons are also immensely compelling. But even if they were only moderately compelling, the existence of such reasons would totally dismantle this video. In a way, the narrator is underhandedly delivering a stinging insult to religious people worldwide, saying they live in the dark ages.
On the other hand, again, if there are reasons to believe in God, then crutch or not, it is something to consider.
Last point, but it's beginning to sound repetitive: this would be valid if there were no evidence that we do indeed occupy a privileged place in the universe (in terms of importance). But there is evidence. Perhaps there is still debate going on about that, but the scientific data are fairly clear: there are only a handful of places and times in the universe that intelligent life could exist (and maybe only one unique time and place). If that is what the data say, then again: how is this arrogant?
But instead, religious folk, and Christians in particular, have many reasons to believe! If you follow my blog, you'll find some of those reasons.
As for the rest of my critique of the video, I have identified six common objections to religion in general, and Christianity in particular, and I offered a response to the first three last time. Here I will go through the three remaining objections raised in this video.
The problem for the atheist who espouses the views in this video is there are not only many adequate reasons to believe in a god in general, and the Christian God in particular, but these reasons are also immensely compelling. But even if they were only moderately compelling, the existence of such reasons would totally dismantle this video. In a way, the narrator is underhandedly delivering a stinging insult to religious people worldwide, saying they live in the dark ages.
Objection 4: “Religions are just crutches to help us feel better.”
I wonder if religions aren’t just ancient constructs, in an attempt to explain unexplained phenomenon. Though irrational in content, they are not irrational in their emergence. But we no longer live in the dark; science is ablaze in our world, we no longer live in the cave! We no longer require comforting stories that make us feel safe, comforted or valued. Isn’t it time our faith matches our discoveries? Our ideas our new perspective? Greater awe in reality rather than in fantasy?This has many problems, first and foremost that atheists may hold their lack of belief in any gods also as a crutch. If there is no cosmic being, then who am I held accountable to for my immoral actions? No one. OK, not every atheist feels this way, but certainly some do. In the same vein, not every Christian feels like God is a crutch. Sometimes, I wish God's influence on my life would just go away so I could be autonomous. I mean, who doesn't like the idea of being their own master? Who wants to submit to someone in higher authority than themselves?
On the other hand, again, if there are reasons to believe in God, then crutch or not, it is something to consider.
Objection 5: “It's arrogant to think you have the right religion”
Isn’t it time to stop thinking that we are somehow the reason why this universe was made? That our culture is somehow better than other cultures? It’s time to learn how the universe really is, even if that deflates our conceits, and forces us to admit we do not have all the answers. You must confront these fundamental questions.I wonder why this is arrogant? I've posted on this before, but it bears repeating: ideas aren't arrogant. If you follow the evidence where it leads, how is that arrogant? Furthermore, taking the position that the narrator does, how is his position not arrogant? Saying believers live in the dark ages? The narrator surely thinks he's in a position of privileged knowledge.
Objection 6: “It's arrogant to think we occupy a privileged place in the universe.”
Isn’t it time to stop thinking that we are somehow the reason why this universe was made? That our culture is somehow better than other cultures? It’s time to learn how the universe really is, even if that deflates our conceits, and forces us to admit we do not have all the answers.
Last point, but it's beginning to sound repetitive: this would be valid if there were no evidence that we do indeed occupy a privileged place in the universe (in terms of importance). But there is evidence. Perhaps there is still debate going on about that, but the scientific data are fairly clear: there are only a handful of places and times in the universe that intelligent life could exist (and maybe only one unique time and place). If that is what the data say, then again: how is this arrogant?
Conclusion
Every point made in this video seems nice on the surface, especially if you are already indoctrinated to the ways of the new atheists. Especially if you accept without question the assumption that science and reason are on one side, and faith (which is blind) on the other. But just for a moment examine your assumption. If there are good reasons to believe in Jesus as Lord, then nothing this video says makes any sense. There are no salient points made.Sunday, September 11, 2011
Following up on Pascal's wager: the probability of God
Last time I sort of just asserted that "the probability the bible is true is actually very, very close to one." What if this were true. What if, when you consider all of the evidence, then the probability of the bible being true is really, really high? In that case, as we go back to the question of Pascal's wager, not only do you have an infinite reward in this wager, but you have extremely good odds of that infinite reward existing. Not exactly how the Vegas bookies would set things up, is it?
However, I never gave any sort of evidence for that assertion. Unfortunately, that is the subject of this entire blog, and it would be very difficult to encompass in a single post, but I will try to list several reasons for this to be true.
I'm sure there are more, but I believe this is enough. In fact, if I ever get readers on my blog, you probably would fall asleep before getting through that list. But, perhaps in the coming weeks I'll expand on some or all of these. For now, suffice it to say that the case for Christianity is more than just based on faith. It is a case built on the cumulative evidence from almost every academic discipline you can think of. Sure, each argument can by itself be avoided, but in most cases, in order to deny any single argument, you must appeal to a small, ad hoc probabilities. When taken together, I assert that you have to twist and turn so many times, the mountain of evidence in favor of the Christian view is so great, to deny it is a matter of volition, not rationality. (Of course, I am certain many would disagree with me. Hence, this blog.)
However, I never gave any sort of evidence for that assertion. Unfortunately, that is the subject of this entire blog, and it would be very difficult to encompass in a single post, but I will try to list several reasons for this to be true.
- The universe had a beginning.
- The universe (the laws of physics and the overall make-up of the universe) is exquisitely designed.
- The special set circumstances that must have occurred in order to produce a life-friendly planet was exquisitely finely-tuned (location and composition of the solar system, size of our moon, etc.).
- The origin of life occurred in a geological instant.
- The earliest life was incredibly complex.
- The simplest life is incredibly complex.
- The events that have taken place on this planet, in order for the planet to continue to be life-friendly for the past 4 billion years, have been exquisitely finely-tuned, (and must have taken planning).
- The sequence of events that have taken place before the appearance of man seem designed for the benefit of man.
- The timing of the formation of the solar system is finely-tuned.
- The timing of the appearance of man is finely-tuned.
- Our position in the history of the universe and our location within our universe provides us with the optimal conditions to study our universe.
- The order and rationality of the universe demands an explanation beyond randomness. How can these things emerge out of chaos?
- The existence of immaterial, abstract, transcendent entities (including mathematics, logic, yes, even morality) demands an explanation beyond the material world.
- The existence of the mind and free will demands an explanation beyond the Naturalistic Theory of Evolution.
- The events recorded in Genesis 1 are almost perfectly consistent with the sequence of cosmological, geological, and biological events discerned from science. (Yes, I'm serious.)
- The biblical record has never been adequately challenged from either a historical or archaeological standpoint.
- The preponderance of fulfilled prophecy in the bible is remarkable.
- The emergence of the apostolic church is only consistent with the bible accurately depicting the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
I'm sure there are more, but I believe this is enough. In fact, if I ever get readers on my blog, you probably would fall asleep before getting through that list. But, perhaps in the coming weeks I'll expand on some or all of these. For now, suffice it to say that the case for Christianity is more than just based on faith. It is a case built on the cumulative evidence from almost every academic discipline you can think of. Sure, each argument can by itself be avoided, but in most cases, in order to deny any single argument, you must appeal to a small, ad hoc probabilities. When taken together, I assert that you have to twist and turn so many times, the mountain of evidence in favor of the Christian view is so great, to deny it is a matter of volition, not rationality. (Of course, I am certain many would disagree with me. Hence, this blog.)
Monday, September 14, 2009
The five greatest reasons
At the last meeting, I discussed my idea of going through what I call the five greatest scientific apologetic arguments, one at a time. The first one was the beginning of the universe, and so we talked about the big bang theory, and what theological/philosophical implications it has.
I would say, then, the five greatest reasons are (in no particular order):
All in all, we'll see if we can cover roughly one topic per meeting for the next four meetings (given that we covered number one last time).
I would say, then, the five greatest reasons are (in no particular order):
- The origin of the universe
- The fine-tuning of the universe (including the anthropic principle and our privileged position)
- The origin of life (biochemistry)
- The origin of man (including the moral argument/imago dei)
- The design of life for the benefit of humanity (yes, I did say design of life)
All in all, we'll see if we can cover roughly one topic per meeting for the next four meetings (given that we covered number one last time).
Friday, July 3, 2009
Fully gifted creation
One of the hot button topics these days, at least in terms of Christianity and science, is evolution. Most of the time, the debate/discussion is artificially polarized/caricatured into two camps: creationism and evolution. If you're a Christian, you believe in creation, and if you're smart, you believe in evolution. (Whatever "believe in evolution" means.)
Some refuse to be part of that partisianship. Prominent scientists like Ken Miller and Francis Collins (both authors as well) ascribe to a view commonly called "theistic evolution", which loosely means they affirm both God's existence (both would accept Jesus Christ as their personal Lord and savior), yet also naturalistic evolution. That is, both would deny that God had a hand in creating any of the life by fiat miracle, as many creationists would state.
Howard van Till calls this point of view "fully gifted creation", in that God, when He created the universe, did it in such a perfect way, with the just-right initial conditions, such that everything would unfold according to His plan.
What is interesting about this point of view is that it isn't just a concession to mainstream science, as some creationists claim, but indeed it demonstrates the existence of an Intelligent Designer. If the universe unfolding this way is according to God's plan, then life's history on earth does have a purpose, even if it can be fully explained by "mere" naturalistic forces. In other words, even in a theistic evoltionary worldview, we would expect to see design and fine-tuning in life's history. It is an inevitable consequence of believing in a God "who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will (Eph 1:11)."
I'd really like to hear someone's (anyone's?) thoughts on this topic.
Some refuse to be part of that partisianship. Prominent scientists like Ken Miller and Francis Collins (both authors as well) ascribe to a view commonly called "theistic evolution", which loosely means they affirm both God's existence (both would accept Jesus Christ as their personal Lord and savior), yet also naturalistic evolution. That is, both would deny that God had a hand in creating any of the life by fiat miracle, as many creationists would state.
Howard van Till calls this point of view "fully gifted creation", in that God, when He created the universe, did it in such a perfect way, with the just-right initial conditions, such that everything would unfold according to His plan.
What is interesting about this point of view is that it isn't just a concession to mainstream science, as some creationists claim, but indeed it demonstrates the existence of an Intelligent Designer. If the universe unfolding this way is according to God's plan, then life's history on earth does have a purpose, even if it can be fully explained by "mere" naturalistic forces. In other words, even in a theistic evoltionary worldview, we would expect to see design and fine-tuning in life's history. It is an inevitable consequence of believing in a God "who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will (Eph 1:11)."
I'd really like to hear someone's (anyone's?) thoughts on this topic.
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